Pensees

Thoughts on Religion and Other Subjects

Blaise Pascal

Published posthumously, 1670

"The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of."

"Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point."

Fragments of apologetics, psychology, and moral reflection from one of the most penetrating minds of the seventeenth century. Pascal's Pensees explores the wretchedness and grandeur of humanity, the limits of reason, and the necessity of faith. The work remains a model of psychological insight and rhetorical brilliance.

Section I

Thoughts on Mind and Style

1

The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind. In the one, the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use; so that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and one must have a quite inaccurate mind who reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it is almost impossible they should escape notice.

But in the intuitive mind the principles are found in common use and are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice.

2

Those who are accustomed to judge by feeling do not understand the process of reasoning, for they would understand at first sight and are not used to seek for principles. And others, on the contrary, who are accustomed to reason from principles, do not at all understand matters of feeling, seeking principles and being unable to see at a glance.

4

Mathematics, intuition. True eloquence makes light of eloquence, true morality makes light of morality; that is to say, the morality of the judgment, which has no rules, makes light of the morality of the intellect.

"The last thing one discovers in composing a work is what to put first."

"La dernière chose qu'on trouve en faisant un ouvrage est de savoir celle qu'il faut mettre la première."

19

21

Words differently arranged have a different meaning, and meanings differently arranged have different effects.

29

When we see a natural style, we are quite surprised and delighted, for we expected to see an author and we find a man. Whereas those who have good taste and who seeing a book expect to find a man are quite surprised to find an author.

Section II

The Misery of Man Without God

60

First part: Misery of man without God. Second part: Happiness of man with God. Or, First part: That nature is corrupt. Proved by nature itself. Second part: That there is a Redeemer. Proved by Scripture.

61

Order. I might well have taken this discourse in an order like this: to show the vanity of all conditions of men, to show the vanity of ordinary lives, and then the vanity of philosophic lives, sceptics, stoics; but the order would not have been kept. I know a little what it is, and how few people understand it. No human science can keep it.

66

"For after all what is man in nature? A nothing in regard to the infinite, a whole in regard to nothing, a mean between nothing and the whole; infinitely removed from understanding either extreme."

"Car enfin qu'est-ce que l'homme dans la nature? Un néant à l'égard de l'infini, un tout à l'égard du néant, un milieu entre rien et tout; infiniment éloigné de comprendre les extrêmes."

The end of things and their beginnings are invincibly hidden from him in an impenetrable secret. He is equally incapable of seeing the nothingness from which he was drawn and the infinite in which he is engulfed.

72

Man's disproportion. This is where our innate knowledge leads us. If it be not true, there is no truth in man; and if it be true, he finds therein great cause for humiliation, being compelled to abase himself in one way or another. And since he cannot exist without this knowledge, I wish that, before entering on deeper researches into nature, he would consider her both seriously and at leisure, that he would reflect upon himself also, and knowing what proportion there is...

Let man then contemplate the whole of nature in her full and grand majesty, and turn his vision from the low objects which surround him. Let him gaze on that brilliant light, set like an eternal lamp to illumine the universe; let the earth appear to him a point in comparison with the vast circle described by the sun; and let him wonder at the fact that this vast circle is itself but a very fine point in comparison with that described by the stars in their revolution round the firmament.

But if our view be arrested there, let our imagination pass beyond; it will sooner exhaust the power of conception than nature that of supplying material for conception. The whole visible world is only an imperceptible atom in the ample bosom of nature. No idea approaches it. We may enlarge our conceptions beyond all imaginable space; we only produce atoms in comparison with the reality of things. It is an infinite sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, the circumference nowhere.

82

Imagination. It is that deceitful part in man, that mistress of error and falsity, the more deceptive that she is not always so; for she would be an infallible rule of truth, if she were an infallible rule of falsehood. But being most generally false, she gives no sign of her nature, impressing the same character on the true and the false.

I am not speaking of fools, I am speaking of the wisest men; and it is among them that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion. Reason protests in vain; it cannot set a true price on things.

100

We do not content ourselves with the life we have in ourselves and in our own being; we desire to live an imaginary life in the mind of others, and for this purpose we endeavour to shine. We labour unceasingly to adorn and preserve this imaginary existence and neglect the real. And if we possess calmness, or generosity, or truthfulness, we are eager to make it known, so as to attach these virtues to that imaginary existence.

"We would rather separate them from ourselves to join them to it; and we would willingly be cowards in order to acquire the reputation of being brave."

104

The nature of self-love and of this human Ego is to love self only and consider self only. But what will man do? He cannot prevent this object that he loves from being full of faults and wants. He wants to be great, and he sees himself small. He wants to be happy, and he sees himself miserable. He wants to be perfect, and he sees himself full of imperfections. He wants to be the object of love and esteem among men, and he sees that his faults merit only their hatred and contempt.

This embarrassment in which he finds himself produces in him the most unrighteous and criminal passion that can be imagined; for he conceives a mortal enmity against that truth which reproves him and which convinces him of his faults. He would annihilate it, but, unable to destroy it in its essence, he destroys it as far as possible in his own knowledge and in that of others.

110

Our own interest is again a marvellous instrument for nicely putting out our eyes. The justest man in the world is not allowed to be judge in his own cause; I know some who, in order not to fall into this self-love, have been perfectly unjust out of opposition. The sure way of losing a just cause has been to get it recommended to these men by their near relatives.

115

Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows nothing of this.

L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature; mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser: une vapeur, une goutte d'eau suffit pour le tuer. Mais quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parce qu'il sait qu'il meurt; et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien.

"All our dignity consists then in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot fill. Let us endeavour then to think well; this is the principle of morality."

"Toute notre dignité consiste donc en la pensée. C'est de là qu'il faut nous relever, et non de l'espace et de la durée que nous ne saurions remplir. Travaillons donc à bien penser: voilà le principe de la morale."

347

116

It is not from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government of my thought. I shall have no more if I possess worlds. By space the universe encompasses and swallows me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the world.

Section III

Of the Necessity of the Wager

131

Ennui. Nothing is so insufferable to man as to be completely at rest, without passions, without business, without diversion, without study. He then feels his nothingness, his forlornness, his insufficiency, his dependence, his weakness, his emptiness. There will immediately arise from the depth of his heart weariness, gloom, sadness, fretfulness, vexation, despair.

132

A trifle consoles us, for a trifle distresses us.

136

I have discovered that all the unhappiness of men arises from one single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber. A man who has enough to live on, if he knew how to stay with pleasure at home, would not leave it to go to sea or to besiege a town. A commission in the army would not be bought so dearly, but that it is found insufferable not to budge from the town; and one only looks for conversation and entering games, because he cannot remain with pleasure at home.

J'ai découvert que tout le malheur des hommes vient d'une seule chose, qui est de ne savoir pas demeurer en repos dans une chambre. Un homme qui a assez de bien pour vivre, s'il savait demeurer chez soi avec plaisir, n'en sortirait pas pour aller sur la mer ou au siège d'une place. On n'achètera une charge à l'armée si cher que parce qu'on trouverait insupportable de ne bouger de la ville; et on ne recherche les conversations et les divertissements des jeux que parce qu'on ne peut demeurer chez soi avec plaisir.

"Men spend their time in following a ball or a hare; it is the pleasure even of kings."

"Les hommes s'occupent à suivre une balle et un lièvre: c'est le plaisir même des rois."

139

Diversion. When I have occasionally set myself to consider the different distractions of men, the pains and perils to which they expose themselves at court or in war, whence arise so many quarrels, passions, bold and often bad ventures, etc., I have discovered that all the unhappiness of men arises from one single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own chamber.

Hence it comes that play and the society of women, war and high posts, are so sought after. Not that there is in fact any happiness in them, or that men imagine true bliss to consist in money won at play, or in the hare which they hunt; we would not take these as a gift. We do not seek that easy and peaceful lot which permits us to think of our unhappy condition, nor the dangers of war, nor the labour of office, but the bustle which averts these thoughts of ours and amuses us.

140

Reasons why we like the chase better than the quarry. Hence it comes that men so much love noise and stir; hence it comes that the prison is so horrible a punishment; hence it comes that the pleasure of solitude is a thing incomprehensible. And it is in fact the greatest source of happiness in the condition of kings that men try incessantly to divert them and to procure for them all manner of pleasures.

The king is surrounded by persons whose only thought is to divert the king and to prevent his thinking of self. For he is unhappy, king though he be, if he think of himself.

143

Men are so necessarily mad, that not to be mad would amount to another form of madness.

Section IV

Of the Means of Belief

185

The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know. We feel it in a thousand things. I say that the heart naturally loves the Universal Being, and also itself naturally, according as it gives itself to them; and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You have rejected the one and kept the other. Is it by reason that you love yourself?

"The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know."

"Le cœur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point."

277

187

It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason.

C'est le cœur qui sent Dieu, et non la raison. Voilà ce que c'est que la foi: Dieu sensible au cœur, non à la raison.

188

Faith is a gift of God; do not believe that we said it was a gift of reasoning. Other religions do not say this of their faith. They only gave reasoning in order to arrive at it, and yet it does not bring them to it.

189

The way of God, who disposes all things kindly, is to put religion into the mind by reason, and into the heart by grace. But to will to put it into the mind and heart by force and threats is not to put religion there, but terror.

190

We must begin by showing that religion is not contrary to reason; then that it is venerable, to give it respect; then to make it lovable, to make good men hope it is true; finally, to show that it is true.

194

Custom is our nature. What are our natural principles but principles of custom? In children they are those which they have received from the habits of their fathers, as hunting in animals. A different custom will cause different natural principles. This is seen in experience; and if there are some natural principles ineradicable by custom, there are also some customs opposed to nature, ineradicable by nature or by a second custom.

199

One must know oneself. If this does not serve to discover truth, it at least serves as a rule of life, and there is nothing better.

Section V

Justice and the Reason of Effects

205

The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary things, and of the majority in others. Whence comes this? From the might which is in them. Hence it comes that kings, who have power from elsewhere, do not follow the majority of their ministers. No doubt equality of goods is just; but, being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just to obey might.

206

Justice is subject to dispute; might is easily recognised and is not disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might has gainsaid justice and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus, being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just.

"Being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong just."

"Ne pouvant faire que ce qui est juste fût fort, on a fait que ce qui est fort fût juste."

230

The power of kings is founded on the reason and on the folly of the people, and specially on their folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world has weakness for its foundation, and this foundation is wonderfully sure; for there is nothing more sure than this, that the people will be weak. What is based on sound reason is very ill-founded, as the estimate of wisdom.

233

Why do we follow the majority? Is it because they have more reason? No, because they have more power. Why do we follow the ancient laws and opinions? Is it because they are more sound? No, but because they are unique and remove from us the root of difference.

238

I can well conceive a man without hands, feet, head (for it is only experience which teaches us that the head is more necessary than feet). But I cannot conceive man without thought; he would be a stone or a brute.

242

The only thing which consoles us for our miseries is diversion, and yet this is the greatest of our miseries. For it is this which principally hinders us from reflecting upon ourselves and which makes us insensibly ruin ourselves. Without this we should be in a state of weariness, and this weariness would spur us to seek a more solid means of escaping from it. But diversion amuses us, and leads us unconsciously to death.

246

All men naturally hate one another. They employ lust as far as possible in the service of the public weal. But this is only a pretence and a false image of love; for at bottom it is only hate.

Section VI

The Philosophers

274

If we submit everything to reason, our religion will have no mysterious and supernatural element. If we offend the principles of reason, our religion will be absurd and ridiculous.

276

The grandeur of man is great in that he knows himself to be miserable. A tree does not know itself to be miserable. It is then being miserable to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.

"All these same miseries prove man's greatness. They are the miseries of a great lord, of a deposed king."

"Toutes ces misères mêmes prouvent sa grandeur. Ce sont misères de grand seigneur, misères d'un roi dépossédé."

277

278

Man is neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute.

282

The stoics say, "Retire within yourselves; it is there you will find your rest." And that is not true. Others say, "Go out of yourselves; seek happiness in amusement." And this is not true. Illness comes. Happiness is neither without us nor within us. It is in God, both without us and within us.

285

The philosophers. We are full of things which take us out of ourselves. Our instinct makes us feel that we must seek our happiness outside ourselves. Our passions impel us outside, even when no objects present themselves to excite them. External objects tempt us of themselves, and call to us even when we are not thinking of them. And thus philosophers have said in vain: "Retire within yourselves, you will find your good there." We do not believe them, and those who believe them are the most empty and the most foolish.

289

We must know ourselves better. Even if that does not help us find the truth, at least it helps us order our life, and there is nothing more proper.

294

The sciences have two extremes which meet. The first is the pure natural ignorance in which all men find themselves at birth. The other extreme is that reached by great intellects, who, having run through all that men can know, find they know nothing, and come back again to that same ignorance from which they set out; but this is a learned ignorance which is conscious of itself.

Section VII

Morality and Doctrine

323

There are only two kinds of men: the righteous who believe themselves sinners; the rest, sinners who believe themselves righteous.

328

Whoever would fully know the vanity of man has only to consider the causes and effects of love. The cause is a je ne sais quoi, and the effects are dreadful. This je ne sais quoi, so small an object that we cannot recognise it, agitates a whole country, princes, armies, the entire world.

"Cleopatra's nose: had it been shorter, the whole face of the world would have been changed."

"Le nez de Cléopâtre: s'il eût été plus court, toute la face de la terre aurait changé."

162

331

Let no one say that I have said nothing new; the arrangement of the subject is new. When we play tennis, we both play with the same ball, but one of us places it better.

I had as soon it said that I used words employed before. And in the same way if the same thoughts in a different arrangement do not form a different discourse, no more do the same words in their different arrangement form different thoughts.

334

Nature imitates herself. A seed grown in good ground produces fruit. A principle instilled into a good mind produces fruit. Numbers imitate space, which is of a different nature. All is made and guided by the same Master, root, branches, and fruits; principles and consequences.

338

All our reasoning reduces itself to yielding to feeling. But fancy is like, though contrary to, feeling, so that we cannot distinguish between these contraries. One person says that my feeling is fancy, another that his fancy is feeling. We should have a rule. Reason offers itself, but it is pliable in every sense; and thus there is no rule.

339

Two things instruct man about his whole nature: instinct and experience.

Section VIII

The Foundations of the Christian Religion

397

The Christian religion, then, teaches men these two truths; that there is a God whom men can know, and that there is a corruption in their nature which renders them unworthy of Him. It is equally important to men to know both these points; and it is equally dangerous for man to know God without knowing his own wretchedness, and to know his own wretchedness without knowing the Redeemer who can free him from it.

The knowledge of only one of these points gives rise either to the pride of philosophers, who have known God and not their own wretchedness, or to the despair of atheists, who know their own wretchedness but not the Redeemer.

398

Knowing God without knowing our own wretchedness makes for pride. Knowing our own wretchedness without knowing God makes for despair. Knowing Jesus Christ strikes the balance because he shows us both God and our own wretchedness.

410

Other religions, as the pagan, are more popular, for they consist in externals. But they are not for educated people. A purely intellectual religion would be more suited to the clever, but it would be of no use to the common people. The Christian religion alone is adapted to all, being composed of externals and internals. It raises the common people to the internal, and humbles the proud to the external; it is not perfect without the two, for the people must understand the spirit of the letter, and the learned must submit their spirit to the letter.

418

"All that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, or the pride of life. Wretched is the cursed earth which these three rivers of fire enflame rather than water."

425

What reason have atheists for saying that we cannot rise from the dead? What is more difficult, to be born or to rise again; that what has never been should be, or that what has been should be again? Is it more difficult to come into existence than to return to it? Custom makes the one appear easy to us; want of custom makes the other impossible. A popular way of judging!

430

There is a great difference between rest and security. Nothing gives security but truth; nothing gives rest but the sincere search for truth.

Section IX

The Wager

233

Let us now speak according to natural lights. If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who will dare to undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who have no affinity to Him.

Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give a reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a foolishness, stultitiam; and then you complain that they do not prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is in lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense.

"Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing."

"Pesons le gain et la perte en prenant croix que Dieu est. Estimons ces deux cas: si vous gagnez, vous gagnez tout; si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien."

"Yes, but I must wager" (you might say); "there is no choice, I am already committed. Which shall I choose? Let your reason decide. You have two things to lose: the true and the good; and two things to stake: your reason and your will, your knowledge and your beatitude; and your nature has two things to shun: error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one than the other, since you must of necessity choose. But your beatitude? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is."

"Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is."

"That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but perhaps I wager too much."

"Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you must of necessity play), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness."

"And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two; and you would act foolishly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite."

"This is demonstrable: and if men are capable of any truths, this is one."

"I confess it, I admit it. But still, is there no means of seeing the faces of the cards?"

"Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc."

"Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am not free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What, then, would you have me do?"

"True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured."

"Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness."

"But this is what I am afraid of."

"And why? What have you to lose?"

"Now, what harm will befall you in taking this side? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those poisonous pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others?"

"I tell you that you will gain thereby in this life, and that at each step you take on this road you will see so great certainty of gain, so much nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognise that you have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have given nothing."

Section X

Miracles

803

There are three means of belief: reason, custom, inspiration. The Christian religion, which alone has reason, does not acknowledge as her true children those who believe without inspiration. It is not that she excludes reason and custom. On the contrary, the mind must be opened to proofs, must be confirmed by custom and offer itself in humbleness to inspirations, which alone can produce a true and saving effect.

807

The heart has its order; the intellect has its own, which is by principle and demonstration. The heart has another. We do not prove that we ought to be loved by enumerating in order the causes of love; that would be ridiculous.

"Jesus Christ and Saint Paul employ the rule of love, not of intellect; for they would warm, not instruct. So also Saint Augustine. This order consists chiefly in digressions on each point to indicate the end, and keep it always in sight."

809

When the Word of God, which is really true, is false literally, it is true spiritually. Sede a dextris meis: this is false literally, therefore it is true spiritually. In these expressions, God is spoken of in human fashion; and this means nothing else but that the intention which men have in making another sit at their right hand, God will have also. It is then an indication of the intention of God, not of His manner of executing it.

Section XI

Proofs of Jesus Christ

547

Jesus Christ, whom the two Testaments regard, the Old as its hope, the New as its model, and both as their centre.

548

The two oldest books in the world are Moses and Job, the one a Jew and the other a Gentile. Both of them look upon Jesus Christ as their common centre and object: Moses in relating the promises of God to Abraham, Jacob, etc., and his prophecies; and Job: Quis mihi det ut, etc. Scio enim quod Redemptor meus vivit, etc.

555

What man ever had more renown? The whole Jewish people foretell him before his coming. The Gentile people worship him after his coming. The two peoples, Gentile and Jewish, regard him as their centre. And yet what man enjoys this renown less? Of thirty-three years, he lives thirty without appearing. For three years he passes as an impostor; the priests and the chief people reject him; his friends and his nearest relatives despise him.

"Finally, he dies, betrayed by one of his own disciples, denied by another, and abandoned by all."

556

What part, then, has he in this renown? Never had man so much renown; never had man more ignominy. All that renown has served only for us, to render us capable of recognising him; and he had none of it for himself.

558

Jesus Christ is a God whom we approach without pride, and before whom we humble ourselves without despair.

Section XII

The Hidden God

556

It will be one of the confusions of the damned to see that they are condemned by their own reason, by which they claimed to condemn the Christian religion.

559

If there were no obscurity, man would not be sensible of his corruption; if there were no light, man would not hope for a remedy. Thus, it is not only fair, but advantageous to us, that God be partly hidden and partly revealed; since it is equally dangerous to man to know God without knowing his own wretchedness, and to know his own wretchedness without knowing God.

"Truly, thou art a hidden God."

"Véritablement tu es un Dieu caché."

Isaiah 45:15

565

If God had permitted only one religion, it would have been too easily known; but when we look at it more closely, we clearly discern the truth amidst this confusion. The premise: the true religion must teach us to worship only God and to love only Him. The conclusion: the true religion must teach us our duty, our weakness, our pride and lust, and the remedies, humility, mortification.

585

Instead of complaining that God had hidden Himself, you will give Him thanks for not having revealed so much of Himself; and you will also give Him thanks for not having revealed Himself to haughty sages, unworthy to know so holy a God.

586

There is enough light for those who only desire to see, and enough obscurity for those who have a contrary disposition.

Il y a assez de lumière pour ceux qui ne désirent que de voir, et assez d'obscurité pour ceux qui ont une disposition contraire.

"There is enough light for those who only desire to see, and enough obscurity for those who have a contrary disposition."

"Il y a assez de lumière pour ceux qui ne désirent que de voir, et assez d'obscurité pour ceux qui ont une disposition contraire."

Section XIII

On the Condition of Man

693

The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me.

Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m'effraie.

"The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me."

"Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m'effraie."

694

How many kingdoms know us not!

695

Why is my knowledge limited? Why my stature? Why my life to one hundred years rather than to a thousand? What reason has nature had for giving me such, and for choosing this number rather than another in the infinity of those from which there is no more reason to choose one than another, trying nothing else?

699

When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the little space which I fill and even can see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant and which know me not, I am frightened and am astonished at being here rather than there; for there is no reason why here rather than there, why now rather than then.

Who has put me here? By whose order and direction have this place and time been allotted to me? Memoria hospitis unius diei praetereuntis.

700

The last act is tragic, however happy all the rest of the play is; at the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and that is the end forever.

Le dernier acte est sanglant, quelque belle que soit la comédie en tout le reste: on jette enfin de la terre sur la tête, et en voilà pour jamais.

"The last act is tragic, however happy all the rest of the play is; at the last a little earth is thrown upon our head, and that is the end forever."

"Le dernier acte est sanglant, quelque belle que soit la comédie en tout le reste: on jette enfin de la terre sur la tête, et en voilà pour jamais."

702

Between us and heaven or hell there is only life, which is the frailest thing in the world.

705

Let us imagine a number of men in chains, and all condemned to death, where some are killed each day in the sight of the others, and those who remain see their own fate in that of their fellows and wait their turn, looking at each other sorrowfully and without hope. It is an image of the condition of men.

Section XIV

Conclusion

792

What a chimera then is man! What a novelty! What a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all things, imbecile worm of the earth; depositary of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error; the pride and refuse of the universe!

Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme! Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige! Juge de toutes choses, imbécile ver de terre; dépositaire du vrai, cloaque d'incertitude et d'erreur; gloire et rebut de l'univers!

"What a chimera then is man! What a novelty! What a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy!"

"Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme! Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige!"

Who will unravel this tangle? Nature confutes the sceptics, and reason confutes the dogmatists. What then will you become, O men! who try to find out by your natural reason what is your true condition? You cannot avoid one of these sects, nor adhere to one of them.

793

Know then, proud man, what a paradox you are to yourself. Humble yourself, weak reason; be silent, foolish nature; learn that man infinitely transcends man, and learn from your Master your true condition, of which you are ignorant. Hear God.

For in fact, if man had never been corrupt, he would enjoy in his innocence both truth and happiness with assurance; and if man had always been corrupt, he would have no idea of truth or bliss. But, wretched as we are, and more so than if there were no greatness in our condition, we have an idea of happiness and cannot reach it. We perceive an image of truth and possess only a lie. Incapable of absolute ignorance and of certain knowledge, we have thus been manifestly in a degree of perfection from which we have unhappily fallen.

795

The greatness of man. The greatness of man is so evident that it is even proved by his wretchedness. For what in animals is nature, we call in man wretchedness; by which we recognise that, his nature being now like that of animals, he has fallen from a better nature which once was his.

For who is unhappy at not being a king, except a deposed king? Was Paulus Aemilius unhappy at being no longer consul? On the contrary, everybody thought him happy in having been consul, because the office could only be held for a time. But Perseus was so unhappy at no longer being king, because the condition of royalty implied his being always king, that it was thought strange that he bore living.

"Who is unhappy at having only one mouth? And who is not unhappy at having only one eye? Perhaps no one was ever sad at not having three eyes, but anyone is inconsolable at having none."

797

All these same miseries prove man's greatness. They are the miseries of a great lord, of a deposed king.

799

We are so presumptuous that we would wish to be known by all the world, even by people who shall come after, when we shall be no more; and we are so vain that the esteem of five or six neighbours delights and contents us.

800

Truth is so obscure in these times, and falsehood so established, that, unless we love the truth, we cannot know it.

La vérité est si obscurcie en ce temps, et le mensonge si établi, qu'à moins d'aimer la vérité, on ne saurait la connaître.

"Truth is so obscure in these times, and falsehood so established, that, unless we love the truth, we cannot know it."

"La vérité est si obscurcie en ce temps, et le mensonge si établi, qu'à moins d'aimer la vérité, on ne saurait la connaître."

"The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of. We feel it in a thousand things."

"Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point. On le sent en mille choses."

"Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed."

"L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature; mais c'est un roseau pensant."

- Blaise Pascal

End of Selection

Pensees (1670). Translation by W.F. Trotter. Selections from the traditional Brunschvicg arrangement.