A Disquisition on Government
Written 1843–1850, Published Posthumously 1851
Calhoun's systematic treatise on the nature of government, the dangers of unchecked majority rule, and his theory of the "concurrent majority" as a safeguard for minority interests. This work represents one of the most rigorous American contributions to political philosophy.
Part I: The Origin of Government
In order to have a clear and just conception of the nature and object of government, it is indispensable to understand correctly what that constitution or law of our nature is in which government originates, or to express it more fully and accurately, that law without which government would not and with which it must necessarily exist. Without this there can be no systematic and accurate knowledge of the science of government.
That such a law exists is as certain as that man exists. It belongs to that class of facts which, while they are universally admitted, are nevertheless so difficult of investigation that they are seldom subjected to that searching analysis which would establish their precise character and trace out all their important consequences. In the investigation I am about to make, I shall assume as postulates that government is necessary to man, and that there can be no orderly society without it.
"Man is so constituted that government is necessary to the existence of society, and society to his existence and the perfection of his faculties."
Man is so constituted that government is necessary to the existence of society, and society to his existence and the perfection of his faculties. It follows that government has its origin in this twofold constitution of his nature: the sympathetic or social feelings constituting the remote, and the individual or direct, the proximate cause.
If man had been differently constituted in either particular—if, instead of being social in his nature, he had been created without sympathy for his kind and independent of others for his safety and existence; or if, on the other hand, he had been so created as to feel more intensely what affected others than what affected himself (if that were possible), or even had this supposed interest been equal—it is manifest that in either case there would have been no necessity for government, and that none would ever have existed.
But although society and government are thus intimately connected with and dependent on each other, of the two society is the greater. It is the first in the order of things and in the dignity of its object; that of society being primary—to preserve and perfect our race—and that of government secondary and subordinate—to preserve and perfect society. Both are, however, necessary to the existence and well-being of our race and equally of divine ordination.
The Constitution of Human Nature
I have said that man is so constituted as to be a social being. His inclinations and wants, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to associate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in any age or country, in any state other than the social. In no other, indeed, could he exist, and in no other—were it possible for him to exist—could he attain to a full development of his moral and intellectual faculties or raise himself, in the scale of being, much above the level of the brute creation.
I next assume also as a fact not less incontestable that, while man is so constituted as to make the social state necessary to his existence and the full development of his faculties, this state itself cannot exist without government. The assumption rests on universal experience. In no age or country has any society or community ever been found, whether enlightened or savage, without government of some description.
"The individual feelings are stronger than the social feelings. Each, as far as it depends on himself, puts himself above all others."
Having its origin in the constitution of man, the individual feelings are stronger than the social feelings. I say stronger, because while we are so constituted as to feel intensely what affects us directly, we feel in the same manner, though in a less degree, what affects us through others—our parents, friends, neighborhood, country, and even our race. Man is so constituted that what affects him directly has a greater influence on him than what affects him indirectly through others; that it is much more easy to attend to the former than the latter.
Each, consequently, as far as it depends on himself, puts himself above all others, and is apt to regard the interests of others as secondary to his own. And hence the tendency to a universal state of conflict between individual and individual, accompanied by the connected passions of suspicion, jealousy, anger, and revenge—followed by insolence, fraud, and cruelty—and, if not prevented by some controlling power, ending in a state of universal discord and confusion destructive of the social state and the ends for which it is ordained.
This controlling power, wherever vested or by whomsoever exercised, is Government. It follows, then, that man is so constituted that government is necessary to the existence of society, and society to his existence and the perfection of his faculties. It follows also that government has its origin in this twofold constitution of his nature; the sympathetic or social feelings constituting the remote, and the individual or direct, the proximate cause.
The Tendency of Government to Disorder
But government, although intended to protect and preserve society, has itself a strong tendency to disorder and abuse of its powers, as all experience and almost every page of history testify. The cause is to be found in the same constitution of our nature which makes government indispensable.
The powers which it is necessary for government to possess in order to repress violence and preserve order cannot execute themselves. They must be administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger than the social feelings. And hence the powers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression on the part of others will, if left unguarded, be by them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community.
"The powers vested in government to prevent injustice and oppression will, if left unguarded, be converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community."
That by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant by Constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to Government. Having its origin in the same principle of our nature, constitution stands to government as government stands to society; and as the end for which society is ordained would be defeated without government, so that for which government is ordained would, in a great measure, be defeated without constitution.
But they differ in this striking particular. There is no difficulty in forming government. It is not even a matter of choice whether there shall be one or not. Like breathing, it is not permitted to depend on our volition. Necessity will force it on all communities in some one form or another. Very different is the case as to constitution. Instead of a matter of necessity, it is one of the most difficult tasks imposed on man to form a constitution worthy of the name.
The Problem of Constitution
How can those who are invested with the powers of government be prevented from employing them as the means of aggrandizing themselves instead of using them to protect and preserve society? This is the great and difficult question. There is but one certain way of preventing it, and that is by the adoption of some restriction or limitation which shall so effectually prevent any one interest or combination of interests from using the powers of government to aggrandize itself at the expense of others as to make it the interest of each to defend the rights of all.
The nature of the restriction or limitation, and in what it shall consist, is an inquiry of the deepest importance, both in theory and in practice. It follows from what has been said that this restriction or limitation must be able to counteract the tendency of the government to oppression and abuse of its powers; and at the same time be compatible with the perfect organization of society.
To perfect the power of the government against itself, it would seem to be necessary to devise such an organism as will furnish the means by which resistance may be systematically and peaceably made on the part of the governed to oppression and abuse of power on the part of the government. The object to be attained is to resist and prevent oppression and abuse, and not to allow the powers of the government to be arrested and government itself to be overthrown.
"There is but one way in which this can possibly be done, and that is by such an organism of the government—and if necessary for the purpose of the community also—as will, by dividing and distributing the powers of government, give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws or a veto on their execution."
Part II: The Numerical Majority
There are but two means by which the sense of the community may be taken: one, simply by the right of suffrage, unaided; the other, by the right through a proper organism. Each collects the sense of the majority. But one regards numbers only and considers the whole community as a unit having but one common interest throughout, and collects the sense of the greater number of the whole as that of the community.
The other, on the contrary, regards interests as well as numbers—considering the community as made up of different and conflicting interests, as far as the action of the government is concerned—and takes the sense of each through its majority or appropriate organ, and the united sense of all as the sense of the entire community. The former of these I shall call the numerical or absolute majority, and the latter the concurrent or constitutional majority.
I call it the constitutional majority because it is an essential element in every constitutional government, be its form what it may. So great is the difference, politically speaking, between the two majorities that they cannot be confounded without leading to great and fatal errors; and yet the distinction between them has been so entirely overlooked that when the term majority is used in political discussions, it is applied exclusively to designate the numerical—as if there were no other.
"The numerical majority is made up of those who have the greatest number of votes, without regard to how they are distributed among the interests of the community."
Until this distinction is recognized and better understood, there will continue to be great liability to error in properly constructing constitutional governments, especially of the popular form, and of preserving them when properly constructed. Until then, the latter will have a strong tendency to slide, first, into the government of the numerical majority, and finally into absolute government of some other form. To show that such must be the case, and at the same time to mark more strongly the difference between the two in order to guard against the danger of overlooking it, I propose to consider the subject more at length.
The Dangers of the Numerical Majority
The first and leading error which naturally arises from overlooking the distinction referred to is to confound the numerical majority with the people, and this so completely as to regard them as identical. This is a consequence that necessarily results from considering the numerical as the only majority. All admit that a popular government, or democracy, is the government of the people, for the terms imply this. A perfect government of the kind would be one which would embrace the consent of every citizen or member of the community; but as this is impracticable in the opinion of those who regard the numerical as the only majority and who can perceive no other way by which the sense of the people can be taken, they are compelled to adopt this as the only true basis of popular government, in contradistinction to the concurrent majority.
But when once formed, the community will be divided into two great parties—a major and minor—between which there will be incessant struggles on the one side to retain and on the other to obtain the majority and thereby the control of the government and the advantages it confers.
"The numerical majority will divide the community into two great parties, which will be engaged in perpetual struggles to obtain control of the government."
So deeply seated, indeed, is this tendency to conflict between the different interests or portions of the community that it would result from the action of the government itself, even though it were possible to find a community where the people were all of the same pursuits, placed in the same condition of life, and in every respect so situated as to be without inequality of condition or diversity of interests.
The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of the government, and thereby of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other considerations, ample to divide even such a community into two great hostile parties.
In order to obtain a majority in free and popular governments, the parties in their struggles resort to various expedients. Among these may be mentioned—bribery, corruption, intrigue, and all the debasing arts which enable knaves to control honest men. The more corrupting of these expedients must necessarily be resorted to by the major party in order to obtain and retain the majority, and hence all the corrupting influence of government will be in the hands of the numerical majority.
The Concurrent Majority
The necessary consequence of taking the sense of the community by the concurrent majority is that the united sense of all the interests shall be obtained, no one of which can be obtained or defeated by the others, however great their aggregate number. Such is the effect of the concurrent majority as to make it impossible for any one interest or combination of interests to obtain exclusive control—the inevitable result of the numerical majority without the concurrent.
"It gives to each interest or portion of the community a negative on the others. It is this mutual negative among its various conflicting interests which invests each with the power of protecting itself."
It gives to each interest or portion of the community a negative on the others. It is this mutual negative among its various conflicting interests which invests each with the power of protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each where only they can be securely placed—under its own guardianship. Without this there can be no systematic, peaceful, or effective resistance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflict with the others—or of the stronger to oppress the weaker.
From this there results another marked difference between the two majorities. In the government of the concurrent majority, one portion of the community may be thrown by the action of the government upon the resources of another portion. But in the government of the numerical majority, the case is different. The dominant portion of the community may exact from the whole whatever amount they please, and throw the whole on the minority.
The one regards interests as well as numbers; the other numbers only. The one recognizes the community as made up of different and conflicting interests; the other as of individuals, each perfectly equal with all the rest. The one acts through proper organs; the other directly without any. The one collects the united sense of all the interests of the community; the other the sense of the greater number only.
The Effects of the Two Systems
The effect of the two different majorities on the character of the government is no less different than on its operations and the course of policy. The one tends to elevate the character of the government to the highest point of wisdom and virtue; the other to depress it to the lowest. Neither combats nor conquers its opponents, but both leave them in full possession of the field.
The concurrent majority exerts a healthy influence in another respect. It tends to unite the most opposite and conflicting interests and to blend the whole in one common attachment to the country. By giving to each interest, or portion, the power of self-protection, all strife and struggle between them for ascendency is prevented, and thereby not only every feeling calculated to weaken the attachment to the whole is suppressed, but the individual and the social feelings are made to unite in one common devotion to country.
"The concurrent majority tends to unite the most opposite and conflicting interests and to blend the whole in one common attachment to the country."
Each sees and feels that it can best promote its own prosperity by conciliating the good will and promoting the prosperity of the others. And hence there will be diffused throughout the whole community kind feelings between its different portions and, instead of antipathy, a rivalry amongst them to promote the interests of each other, as far as this can be done consistently with the interest of all.
Under the influence of these combined causes, the interests of each would be merged in the common interests of the whole; and thus the community would become a unit by becoming the common center of attachment of all its parts. And hence, instead of faction, strife, and struggle for party ascendency, there would be patriotism, nationality, harmony, and a struggle only for supremacy in promoting the common good of the whole.
Objections Answered
But it may be asked, how is the concurrent majority to be applied in practice? The question is not without difficulty, and on its answer the success of the system depends. If it be impracticable to obtain the consent of each separate interest of the community to every act of the government, the system is but a theory which can never be reduced to practice.
The difficulty is greatly diminished by the fact that it is not necessary, in order to give effect to the concurrent majority, that every interest, however small, should have the power of protection. The necessary condition is that the great and distinct interests should be protected—that the community should be divided into a few great interests, to each of which should be given the power of self-protection.
There is another objection, which, if well founded, would be fatal to governments of the concurrent majority. I refer to the objection that they require unanimity, and that unanimity is impossible, it follows that they are impracticable. This objection would be fatal if well founded; but it is not.
"The concurrent majority does not require unanimity; it requires only that each great interest shall have a negative to protect itself."
Unanimity, in the strict sense of the term, is not required by the government of the concurrent majority. It requires only that each great interest of the community shall be so far protected that no important measure can be adopted of which it disapproves. This is very different from requiring perfect unanimity to every measure. All that it requires is that each great interest shall possess the power to arrest action injurious to itself—not the power to prevent all action.
The necessity of unanimity is itself a powerful incentive to compromise. For it is much easier to reconcile conflicting interests by compromise than to compel each to give up its views. The tendency to compromise is one of the best features of the concurrent majority. Instead of promoting faction and conflict, it promotes conciliation and moderation.
Part III: Liberty and Power
There is a great and dangerous error as to the relation between liberty and power. Liberty, as distinguished from power, belongs to the subject, not to the sovereign. It is that portion of his natural freedom which has not been abridged or controlled by the sovereign power. The more this is abridged, the less is his liberty, and the more extensive, the greater is his liberty.
But it does not follow from this that liberty is therefore the greatest good, or that its unlimited extension is desirable. On the contrary, there is an intimate connection between liberty and power; and the object of a good constitution is to unite and preserve both, by so organizing and distributing the powers of government as to prevent either from encroaching on the other.
"It is a great and dangerous error to suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike."
It is a great and dangerous error to suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike—a reward reserved for the intelligent, the patriotic, the virtuous, and deserving, and not a boon to be bestowed on a people too ignorant, degraded, and vicious to be capable either of appreciating or of enjoying it.
Nor is it any disparagement to liberty that such is and ought to be the case. On the contrary, its greatest praise, its proudest distinction, is that an all-wise Providence has reserved it as the noblest and highest reward for the development of our faculties, moral and intellectual. A reward more appropriate than liberty could not be conferred on the deserving, nor a punishment inflicted on the undeserving more just than to be subject to lawless and despotic rule.
This disposes of the error that liberty is the great and only object to be pursued in the organization of government. Important as liberty undoubtedly is, it is not the only good to be obtained. Order, security, and protection to person and property are among the primary objects for which government is ordained. And these can only be obtained through the agency of power.
Liberty and Equality
There is another error, not less great and dangerous, usually associated with the one which has just been considered. I refer to the opinion that liberty and equality are so intimately united that liberty cannot be perfect without perfect equality.
That they are united to a certain extent, and that equality of citizens, in the eyes of the law, is essential to liberty in a popular government, is conceded. But to go further and make equality of condition essential to liberty would be to destroy both liberty and progress. The reason is both necessary and obvious.
"To perfect society, it is necessary to develop the faculties, intellectual and moral, with which man is endowed. But the mainspring to their development... is the desire of individuals to better their condition."
The mainspring to progress is the desire of individuals to better their condition, and the strongest impulse which can be given to it is to leave individuals free to exert themselves in the manner they may deem best for that purpose, as far at least as it can be done consistently with the ends for which government is ordained, and to secure to all the fruits of their exertions.
Now, as individuals differ greatly from each other in intelligence, sagacity, energy, perseverance, skill, habits of industry and economy, physical power, position, and opportunity—the necessary effect of leaving all free to exert themselves to better their condition must be a corresponding inequality between those who may possess these qualities and advantages in a high degree and those who may be deficient in them.
The only means by which this result can be prevented are either to impose such restrictions on the exertions of those who may possess them in a high degree as will place them on a level with those who do not, or to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions. But to impose such restrictions on them would be destructive of liberty, while to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions would be to destroy the desire of bettering their condition.
It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. This gives to progress its greatest impulse. To force the front rank back to the rear or attempt to push forward the rear into line with the front, by the interposition of the government, would put an end to the impulse and effectually arrest the march of progress.
Conclusion
Such are the principles which lie at the foundation of all constitutional governments—which determine their character, their stability, and their efficacy. They constitute the true basis of a science of government, as distinguished from the false foundations on which modern governments have been too often built.
The concurrent majority is the only solid foundation of constitutional liberty. Without it, there can be no constitution, in the true sense of the term; and whatever form of government may exist, it must be either absolute in practice or become so in a short time. There is no other mode by which the powers of government can be effectually and permanently controlled and their abuse prevented.
"The concurrent majority is the only solid foundation of constitutional liberty. Without it, there can be no constitution, in the true sense of the term."
The effect of the concurrent majority is to bring the various interests of the community to act together, and to preserve the just relations between them. It prevents the dominant interest from oppressing the minor interests, while it secures to each its due influence. Under its influence, the members of the community, instead of being arrayed against each other in a struggle for supremacy, are taught to regard their interests as identical, and to feel that they can best promote their own prosperity by promoting the prosperity of all.
Under the numerical majority, these results are reversed. Instead of harmonizing and uniting, it tends to array the different portions of the community against each other; and makes the success of the one the defeat of the other. Instead of a struggle for the common good, it becomes a struggle for supremacy; and instead of mutual attachment, mutual hatred and revenge.
These are truths of vital importance—truths which, if neglected, must lead to the gradual decline and ultimate overthrow of popular governments. The danger to which all free States are exposed may be traced to this source; and the only remedy is to be found in a thorough and accurate knowledge of the nature of government and the principles on which it depends.
Calhoun's Disquisition remains one of the most rigorous theoretical defenses of constitutional restraints on majority power ever written in America. While his application of these principles to defend slavery discredited his immediate cause, his analysis of the tyranny of numerical majorities, the value of concurrent consent, and the dangers of equalitarian ideology continues to influence constitutional thought on both left and right.
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